


Propeller airplanes, either piston or turboprop, that weigh less than 12,500 pounds for takeoff don’t have to meet the takeoff flight requirements, but jets do. But because they are jets, every light jet in Part 23 had been required to meet the engine-out takeoff performance profile that demands minimum climb gradients after an engine failure during takeoff. More recently there is a commuter category that allows airplanes to weigh more than 12,500 pounds for takeoff without meeting all transport standards, but special conditions are still imposed on jets that force them to meet the key transport performance requirements.įor example, the Cessna Citation CJ family of business jets is in the FAR Part 23 “small” airplane category, as is the Beech Premier I, and others. As you know, the big change in airplane certification standards comes at the 12,500-pound maximum takeoff weight where an airplane moves into the transport category. Throughout history the FAA certification standards have treated turbojets differently. I expected the 500 to be held to the same standard as the several light jets already in production, but it wasn’t. Experience worked against me in that case because I didn’t believe that the FAA would create a new certification category just for Eclipse, but it did. The original design was never certifiable, but I didn’t believe the evolved airplane was, either. And that was for an incomplete airplane lacking many basic functions and it would have cost many thousands more per airplane to eventually modify them to match the sales contract.īut I was wrong about the Eclipse 500 chances for certification. It was costing the company more than twice as much to build an Eclipse 500 as it had sold the airplane for. The company also predicted impossibly low empty weights, which then led to unattainable performance and range predictions, and it expected to accomplish all of this in record setting time.īut Eclipse is, at its root, a financial failure first and foremost.

And anybody who took delivery of the 260 or so airplanes to leave the factory has lost all warranties and the promises to modify the airplane to a final and usable status.Ī disaster of this size has many causes, but the most fundamental was a fantasy about the economics of designing, building and supporting airplanes. Anybody who had a deposit for an airplane lost the money. Eclipse investors have lost hundreds of millions, but individuals are also big losers. There has never been a financial failure of this scale in the entire history of general aviation. It does not store any personal data.In late November Eclipse Aviation filed for bankruptcy, and investors, suppliers, Eclipse 500 owners and order holders lost well over $1 billion. The cookie is set by the GDPR Cookie Consent plugin and is used to store whether or not user has consented to the use of cookies. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Performance". This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Other. The cookies is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Necessary". The cookie is set by GDPR cookie consent to record the user consent for the cookies in the category "Functional". The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Analytics". These cookies ensure basic functionalities and security features of the website, anonymously. Necessary cookies are absolutely essential for the website to function properly.
